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WHEN THE NCAA STRIKES, WHO IS CALLED OUT?
INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2010, Reggie Bush, a professional football player
for the New Orleans Saints, broke his right fibula during a game
against the San Francisco 49ers.1 A doctor determined that Bush's
injury would prevent him from competing for four to six weeks during
the 2010-2011 National Football League (NFL) season.2 Some fans
called the injury unfortunate; others called it karma. 3
In the summer of 2010, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) penalized Bush's alma mater, the University of Southern
California (USC), 4 after the NCAA completed a four-year investiga-
tion into NCAA violations committed by Bush.5 The NCAA's inves-
tigation revealed that Bush and his family received improper benefits
from a sports agent while he was competing as a student-athlete for
USC. 6 These actions violated the NCAA's Amateurism legislation,7
which prohibits any student-athlete from accepting transportation or
other benefits from an athlete agent while competing as a collegiate
athlete.8 As a result, the NCAA penalized USC in 2010.9 The USC
1. Josh Katzowitz, Reggie Bush Suffers Broken Leg, Sources Say, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 21, 2010)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/21/sportsline/main6886981.shtml.
2. Pat Yasinskas, What Bush's Injury Means for Saints, ESPN.com NFC SouII BLOG (Sept.
21, 2010, 11:29 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/nfcsouth/post/_/id/13320/what-bushs-injury-means-
for-saints.
3. See Chris Peery, Reggie Bush Hit by the Karma Bus, Out for Weeks, GH.ARUPFOR-
SroRrs.Com Bi.oG (Sept. 21, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://saints.gearupforsports.com/blog/2010/09/
reggie-bush-hit-by-the-karma-bus-out-for-weeks.
4. Report by Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn., University of Southern California Public Infrac-
tions Report, 1 (June 10, 2010) available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/d28c898042cd
d2bc958fd5a6e282e000/20100610+USC+Public+Report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CACHEID
=D28c898042cdd2bc958fd5a6e282eOOO (hereinafter, "NCAA USC Report").
5. NCAA Report refers to Bush as "student-athlete 1." See id.; ESPN.com, NCAA Delivers
Postseason Football Ban, ESPN.CoM (June 10, 2010) http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/
news/story (on file with the author).
6. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 4.
7. See NAT'L COLLIEGIATE A-riiim-ic Ass'N, Manual 2008-2009 NCAA Division I Manual:
Constitution Operating Bylaw, Administrative Bylaw (Aug. 2008) available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/D109.pdf (hereinafter "NCAA Bylaw") Article 12
("Amateurism").
8. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.3 ("Amateurism"). The prohibition of benefits also applies to the
student-athletes' family and friends. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.3.1.2 ("Benefits from Prospective
Agents"). "The term 'agent' includes actual agents, runners (individuals who befriend student-
athletes and frequently distribute impermissible benefits), and financial advisors." National Col-
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penalties were among the most severe penalties the NCAA had
handed down since 2002.10 However, by June of 2010 (just months
before the NCAA completed its investigation and handed down sanc-
tions to USC), Bush had already secured a position in the NFL with
the New Orleans Saints" and therefore hardly felt the repercussions
of his actions.12
The NCAA enforcement program's mission in imposing sanctions is
to "eliminate violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate pen-
alties if violations occur."' 3 The NCAA states that it is committed to
fairness of sanction procedures and timely and equitable resolutions.14
In addition, the NCAA declares that an important concern that is con-
sidered when it imposes violation penalties on universities is the wish
to provide fairness to uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, adminis-
trators, competitors, and other institutions and to compensate for any
unfair competitive advantage gained by the violation. 5 However, by
the time the NCAA discovers an Amateurism violation, the NCAA
possess no ability to sanction the individual that violated the Bylaws
because that individual is no longer a student-athlete. 16
It is necessary to punish the individuals that violate the NCAA's
Amateurism Bylaws.' 7 However, if the NCAA sanctions are imposed
on a university after the university's student-athlete found in violation
of the Bylaws is no longer competing in collegiate athletics, the sanc-
legiate Athletic Association Resources, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Resources" hyperlink; then
follow "Overview of NCAA Bylaw Governing Athlete Agents" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11,
2010). If the student-athlete violates these regulations, the student-athlete is ineligible for inter-
collegiate competition beginning at the time in which the violations started. See NCAA Bylaw
Article 3 ("Amateurism").
9. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 57-63.
10. See Ivan Maisel, Kiffin Not First to Endure Sanctions, ESPN.CoM (June 10, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=maisel ivan&id=5273884.
11. Bush signed a six-year contract with the Saints in July 2006. Len Pasquarelli, Bush Agrees
to Six- Year Deal With Saints, ESPN.Com (July 30, 2010) http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2534056.
12. See Howard Bryant, No Losers in the Reggie Bush Scandal, ESPN.CoM (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?page=bryant/100922.
13. NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of Enforcement Program").
14. Id.
15. National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How We Work" hyperlink; then follow "Infrac-
tions" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
16. See NCAA Bylaw Article 2.8.1 ("Responsibility of Institution"). For an interactive dia-
gram that exhibits the process of typical infractions, see National Collegiate Athletic Association
About the NCAA, http://webl.ncaa.org/web-video/newmedia/flash/NCAA%201nfractions.swf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
17. The NCAA has had a problem with amateurism violations for years. See Ivan Maisel,
NCAA Ruling Indicates a Turning Tide, ESPN.CoM (June 11, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/columns/story?columnist=maisel-ivan&id=4252254.
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tions are inconsistent with the NCAA enforcement program's mis-
sion.18 If the violating individual is a student-athlete who is no longer
competing in collegiate athletics, the NCAA possesses no ability to
sanction that individual.19
This Comment explores NCAA sanctions for Amateurism viola-
tions and analyzes who is actually affected by the imposed penalties. 20
Part II of this Comment outlines the history of the NCAA and the
NCAA's Bylaws.21 Part II also examines three major NCAA Ama-
teurism violations investigated by the NCAA. 22 Part III explores the
sanctions imposed on the violating individuals and their universities. 23
Part III argues that violations imposed on universities after the indi-
vidual responsible for violating the Bylaws has left the university are
inconsistent with the NCAA's purpose in imposing regulations. 24 The
argument proceeds by examining who is actually affected by the sanc-
tions at the university when the student-athlete that incurred viola-
tions has left the university.25 Finally, Part IV examines other
sanctions available to the NCAA that would more adequately fulfill
the NCAA's mission in imposing sanctions and curb Amateurism
violations.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
In 1906, thirteen collegiate universities founded a private associa-
tion, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(IAAUS), to initiate changes in collegiate football. 27 The universities
had major concerns about dangerous practices occurring on the col-
18. See id.; Maisel, supra note 10.
19. The duty of the Committee on Infractions includes the responsibility to "[i]mpose an ap-
propriate penalty or show-cause requirement on a member found to be involved in a major
violation." NCAA Bylaw Article 19.1.3 ("Duties of Committee") (emphasis added).
20. See infra notes 27-253 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27-139 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 141-177 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 229-252 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 178-228 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 140-228 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 254-265 and accompanying text.
27. "The NCAA was founded in 1906 to protect young people from the dangerous and exploi-
tive athletics practices of the time. The rugged nature of early-day football, typified by mass
formations and gang tackling, resulted in numerous injuries and deaths and prompted many
college and universities to discontinue the sport." National Collegiate Athletic Association
About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow
"Who We Are" hyperlink; then follow "About the NCAA history" hyperlink) (last visited Nov.
2, 2010) (hereinafter "NCAA History").
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legiate football fields 28 and intended to create an association that
would regulate the rules and safety in the sport.29 In 1910, the IAAUS
changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association. 30
Today, the NCAA remains a private membership association com-
prised of four-year, post high-school colleges, universities, and other
educational institutions. 31
Although the NCAA was formed to regulate intercollegiate foot-
ball,32 the purpose of the association has greatly expanded. 33 Today,
the basic purpose of the NCAA is to "maintain intercollegiate athlet-
ics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports."3 4 The NCAA derives its authority from its membership insti-
tutions.35 Representatives from these institutions create the NCAA's
rules and policies. 36
B. The NCAA Bylaws
From the time since the NCAA was formed, it has served as the
rule making body for intercollegiate athletics.37 The quantity of rules
and governed categories has immensely grown and expanded since
1906.38 The NCAA's legislation is contained in the NCAA "Constitu-
28. Joseph N. Crowley, In The Arena: The NCAA's First Century, 10 (Nat't Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n 2005), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/ABO6.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. NCAA Bylaw Article 4.02.1 ("Association"). See NCAA Members By Division, (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2010), http://webl.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/divisionListing (compiling a complete list
of "membership institutions").
32. Crowley, supra note 28, at 10.
33. See National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (fol-
low "About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "Who We Are" hyperlink; then follow "Core
Values" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (discussing the values and categories covered by the
NCAA's concern and commitment).
34. NCAA Bylaw Article 1.3.1 ("Basic Purpose").
35. Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, and Infrac-
tions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and The Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & Tiecii. L. 257, 259-60 (2010).
36. National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How we work" hyperlink; then follow "Rules and
Committees" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) ("Representatives from those institutions and
conferences create NCAA rules and policies.") An educational institution becomes a member-
ship institution if it applies for membership, meets the eligibility requirements, and is elected by
the NCAA to become a member. See NCAA Bylaw Article 3 ("NCAA Membership").
37. See NCAA History, supra note 27.
38. See, e.g, Crowley, supra note 28 at 30 (The "Sanity Code" adopted in 1948 to establish
guidelines for recruiting and financial aid.). See also, NCAA History, supra note 27 (The NCAA
created the National Basketball Championship in 1939, NCAA's 75th Convention adopted an
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tion Operating and Administrative Bylaws." 39 The legislation governs
the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics programs of its member
institutions40 and is adopted by the institutions at an annual 41 or spe-
cial42 NCAA Convention. 4 3 The current NCAA Constitution of Op-
erating and Administrative Bylaws cover an infinite number of
substantive areas within intercollegiate athletics, 44 including competi-
tion rules,45 scheduling, 46 admission requirements,47  and academic
matters.4 8 Because the NCAA Constitution governs all membership
institutions,4 9 the NCAA acts as a central legislator and regulator for
the collegiate athletic programs of all membership institutions.50
When a membership institution fails to comply with any NCAA rule
contained in the legislation, the NCAA applies enforcement proce-
dures on the institution.5 '
extensive governance plan to include women's athletics programs, services and representation; in
1983, the NCAA strengthened its academic requirements for student-athletes).
39. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATiii-T1C Ass'N, Manual 2008-2009 NCAA Division I Manual:
Constitution Operating Bylaw, Administrative Bylaw (Aug. 2008) available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/D109.pdf.
40. NCAA Bylaw Article 1.3.2 ("Obligations of Member Institutions"); id. Article 2.1.1 ("Re-
sponsibility for Control").
41. See NCAA Bylaw Article 5.1.1.1 ("Annual Convention") (describing specifics on the "an-
nual convention").
42. See NCAA Bylaw Article 5.1.1.2 ("Special Convention") (describing specifics on "special
convention").
43. NCAA Constitution Section III ("Voting Requirements For Manual").
44. See NCAA Bylaw Article 10 ("Ethical Conduct); Article 11 ("Conduct and Employment
of Athletics Personnel"); Article 12 ("Amateurism"); Article 13 ("Recruiting"); Article 15 ("Fi-
nancial Aid"); Article 16 ("Awards, Benefits and Expenses for Enrolled Student-Athletes"); Ar-
ticle 17 ("Playing and Practice Season"); Article 18 ("Championships and Postseason Football").
45. NCAA Bylaw Article 17.33 ("Playing Rules").
46. See NCAA Bylaw Figure 17-1 ("Maximum Numbers of Contests and Dates of Competi-
tion for Each Sport"); id. Figure 17-2 ("First Practice, Contest or Date of Competition and End
of Season Dates").
47. See NCAA Bylaw Article 14 ("Eligibility: Academic and General Requirements").
48. See id.; see aiso NCAA Bylaw Figure 14-1 ("Initial Eligibility").
49. NCAA Bylaw Article 1.3.2 ("Obligations of Member Institutions").
50. Potuto, supra note 35, at 259.
51. NCAA Bylaws state the following:
Legislation governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletic programs of member
institutions shall apply to basic athletics issues such as admissions, financial aid, eligibil-
ity and recruiting. Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this leg-
islation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be applied to an
institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.
NCAA Bylaw Article 1.3.2 ("Obligations of Member Institutions").
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Because of the enormous number of membership institutions,5 2 is-
sues,53 and areas to regulate, 54 the NCAA is divided into five separate
divisions.55 The NCAA has an Executive Committee, as well as Asso-
ciation-Wide Committees, Board of Directors, President's Council,
and Management Council.56 The Executive Committee oversees
NCAA-wide issues and ensures each division is operating consistent
with the Constitution.57
Each division also empowers a body of institutional presidents and
chancellors.58 Further, each division creates cabinets, committees,
and counsels5 ' that enable experts to evaluate a range of issues and
functions.60 The NCAA committees, counsels, and cabinets are com-
prised of faculty, administrators from member institutions, and admin-
istrators from athletics conferences.61 The NCAA cabinets oversee
areas of NCAA responsibility such as championships, amateurism,
recruiting issues, and academic standards. 62 Several committees have
responsibilities related to the investigation and resolution of NCAA
violations. 63
C. Ability to Sanction
This section examines the history of the NCAA's sanction ability
and explores the NCAA's present sanction authority. Although the
NCAA has always been a rule-making body that bound membership
52. See NCAA Members By Division, (last visited Jan. 15, 2011), http://webl.ncaa.org/online
Dir/exec/divisionListing (compiling a complete list of "membership institutions").
53. See National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"Key Issues") (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
54. See NCAA Bylaw Article 1-33.
55. The membership institutions are divided into three membership categories. The collegiate
university members are further divided into three divisions (1, 11, and III) based on criteria laid
out for each division. See NCAA Bylaw Article 20 ("Division Membership").
56. For a diagram of the NCAA governing structure, See NCAA Bylaw Figure 4-2 ("Associa-
tion Governance Structure").
57. The "Executive Committee" consists of 20 members including a president and 19 voting
members with representatives from Division 1, II, and Ill. See NCAA Bylaw Article 4.1.1 ("Ex-
ecutive Committee: Composition").
58. These bodies set forth policies, rules, and regulations for operating its division. See
NCAA Bylaw Article 4 ("Organization").
59. NCAA Bylaw Article 4.9 ("Committees/Cabinets"). See NCAA Bylaw Figure 4-1 ("Divi-
sion I Governance Structure"); id. Figure 4-2 ("Association Governance Structure").
60. National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How We Work" hyperlink; then follow "Rules and
Committees" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). See NCAA Bylaw Article 21 ("Commit-
tees") (compiling a complete list of cabinets and committees and their areas of responsibility).
61. NCAA staff serves as liaisons, not members. Potuto, supra note 35, at 260 n.6.
62. See NCAA Bylaw Figure 4-1 ("Division I Governance Structure").
63. Potuto, supra note 35, at 282.
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institutions to its rules,6 4 prior to 1953, the NCAA sanction commit-
tee's power was limited to expulsion of any violating institution. 65 In
1953, the NCAA's membership institutions gave the NCAA its first
enforcement power. 66 This enforcement power included the ability to
both impose sanctions without approval from a majority of delegates
and to impose a wide range of sanctions, no longer limited to expul-
sion.67 In addition, the NCAA was given the capability to enforce
"the death penalty," 68 which requires a membership institution to
drop the offending sport for a specified number of seasons. 6 9 Today,
the NCAA Bylaws explicitly give the NCAA the role as enforcer in
collegiate athletics.70
Presently, among the NCAA committees responsible for the inves-
tigation and resolution of NCAA violations7' is the Committee on In-
fractions,72 the Infractions Appeals Committee,73 and the Legislative
Review and Interpretations Committee.74 The Committee on Infrac-
tions is responsible for determining whether rule infractions occurred,
and, if so, for administrating the NCAA enforcement program.75 The
responsibility of the Infractions Committee is to:
[M]ake findings and impose penalties that reflect the magnitude of
the violations in a particular infractions case as well as the degree of
64. See NCAA History, supra note 27.
65. Until the 1950's, the NCAA's ability to sanction schools was limited to recommending the
violating institution for expulsion. After the recommendation was made, it was only enforced if
two-thirds majority of the NCAA delegates voted for expulsion. In 1951, the ability to expel
was rendered void. See RANoY R GRANT & JOHN LEADLEY & ZENON ZYGMONT, THlE Eco-
NOMICS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTs 32 (World Scientific Publishing Co. 2008).
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. "The 'death penalty' is a phrase used by media to describe the most serious NCAA penal-
ties possible. It is not a formal NCAA term. It applies only to repeat violators and can include
eliminating the involved sport for at least one year, the elimination of athletics aid in that sport
for two years and the school relinquishing its Association voting privileges for a four-year pe-
riod." National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Key
Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Rules and Enforcement" hyperlink; then follow "Glossary of
Terms" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
70. See Potuto, supra note 35, at 259.
71. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
72. NCAA Bylaw Article 19.1 ("Committee On Infractions").
73. NCAA Bylaw Article 19.2.1 ("Infractions Appeals Committee").
74. NCAA Bylaw Article 21.7.8.2 ("Legislative Review/Interpretations Committee").
75. "The Divisions I, 11 and III Committees on Infractions are composed of primarily of indi-
viduals from NCAA member institutions. The committees are responsible for determining
whether rules infractions occurred and, if so, what penalties should be applied." See National
Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "About the
NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How We Work" hyperlink; then follow "Infractions" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010). See also, NCAA Bylaw Article 19.1.3 ("Duties of Committee").
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institutional culpability. [The Infraction Committee is also respon-
sible] . . . to pay heed to the interests of all member institutions not
before it by... imposing penalties that more than offset any compet-
itive or other advantage gained by rules-violative conduct. 76
Each NCAA division has its own Infractions Appeals Committee,
whose primary purpose is to hear any appeal by a penalized university
and act on the findings of major violations by the Committee on In-
fractions.77 The Legislative Review/Interpretations Committee is re-
sponsible for determining interpretations of all NCAA legislation and
reviewing interpretations issued by the membership services staff.78
D. NCAA Amateurism: Bylaw Article 12
In the current collegiate athlete industry, the terms "amateurism"
and "ineligible athlete" are common vocabulary in conversation.79
The NCAA proclaims that a membership institution's educational
program and student-athlete's experience with the program is the su-
perior purpose for allowing intercollegiate athletics.80 The NCAA in-
tends for a membership institution's athletic program to be an integral
part of the institution's educational program. The student-athletes are
intended to be an integral part of the institution's student body.81 To
fulfill this goal, the NCAA retains a line of demarcation between in-
tercollegiate athletics and professional sports.82 Without this line, the
educational program would no longer be the superior purpose be-
cause the athletics would have taken precedent.
To protect this line of demarcation, the NCAA rules only allow stu-
dent-athletes with amateur statuses to be eligible for intercollegiate
76. Potuto, supra note 35, at 300.
77. See National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"Key Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Rules Enforcement" hyperlink; then follow "Glossary of
Terms" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
78. NCAA Bylaw Article 21.7.8.2.2 ("Duties").
79. See NCAA Amateurism Certification a Snap for Most, But Cases Can Be Complex, NA-
TIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssocIATION LATEsr Nt-ws, (last visited Feb. 21, 2011), http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaalresources/latest+news/2010+news+stories/novem-
ber/ncaa+amateurism+certification+a+snap+for+most%2C+but+cases+can+be+complex.
80. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12 ("Amateurism"). The NCAA is premised on the idea that
collegiate athletes are students first, athletes second. Leilana McKindra, Secretary of Education
Duncan urges student-athlete balance, NCAA.COM (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/por-
tal/ncaahome?WCM-GLOBALCONTEXT=ncaa/NCAA/NCAA+News/NCAA+News+On-
line/201 0/Association-wide/Secretary+of+Education+Duncan+urges+student-athlete+balance.
81. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12.01.2 ("Clear Line of Demarcation").
82. "A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports." NCAA Bylaw Article 1.3.1 ("Basic Purpose").
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athletics participation.83 To maintain an amateur status, the student-
athlete must follow the eligibility requirements laid out in the Article
12 Bylaws. 84 Article 12 states that an individual loses his or her ama-
teur status, and therefore is ineligible for intercollegiate competition
if/when the individual:
(a) uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in
any form in that sport; (b) accepts a promise of pay even if such pay
is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics
participation; (c) signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play
professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any
consideration received; (d) receives, directly or indirectly, a salary,
reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance
from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or
participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations;
(e) competes on any professional athletics team, even if no pay or
remuneration for expenses was received; (f) after initial full-time
collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft; or (g) enters
into an agreement with an agent.8 5
Situations where a sports agent and a student-athlete are in commu-
nication threatens the line of demarcation and accordingly, threatens
the student-athlete's amateur status. Article 12 was enacted to deal
with this problem and deems an individual ineligible for intercollegi-
ate competition if he agrees verbally, or in writing, to be represented
by an athlete agent in the present or in the future for the purpose of
marketing the individual's athletic ability or reputation in that sport.86
In addition, the individual may not accept transportation or other ben-
efits from an agent or any person who represents any individual in the
marketing of his athletic ability.87 This prohibition also applies to the
individual's relatives and friends.88
83. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.01.1 ("Eligibility for Intercollegiate Athletics").
84. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12 ("Amateurism"). Although the NCAA draws a difference
between an "individual" and a "student-athlete," amateur status may be lost or compromised as
a result of activities prior to enrollment in college. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.01.3 ('Individual' vs.
'Student-Athlete'). See id. for differences in the meaning of "individual" and "student-athlete."
85. NCAA Bylaw Article 12 ("Amateur status"). Prohibited forms of "payment" include, but
are not limited to, salary, gratuity compensation, bonuses, game receipts, expenses, awards, ben-
efits, payment based on performance, preferential treatment, and prizes for participation in an
institution's promotional activity. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12.1.2.1 "(Prohibited Forms of
Pay").
86. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.3.1 ("General Rule").
87. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.3.1.2 ("Benefits from Prospective Agents"). "The student-ath-
lete shall not receive any extra benefit. The term 'extra benefit' refers to any special arrange-
ment by an institutional employee or representative of the institution's athletics interests to
provide the student-athlete or his or her relatives or friends with a benefit not expressly author-
ized by NCAA legislation." NCAA Bylaw Article 16.11.2 ("General Rule").
88. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.3.1.2 ("Benefits from Prospective Agents").
2011] 127
128 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 7:119
E. Responsibility of Membership Institutions
Although the NCAA's regulation of Amateurism deals primarily
with the student-athlete, membership institutions are also responsible
to assist in maintaining the line of demarcation.89 The NCAA Bylaws
state that each membership institution has a responsibility to control
its intercollegiate athletic program in compliance with all applicable
NCAA rules and regulations. 90 The institution is required to monitor
its programs to ensure it is in compliance, and to identify and report to
the NCAA instances where compliance has not been achieved.9' In a
situation where compliance has not been achieved, the institution is
required to fully cooperate with the NCAA in its investigation and
take appropriate corrective actions for remedying the fault.92
The NCAA further attempts to curb violating conduct by holding
membership institutions accountable for any violating actions by the
institution's representatives, which occur within its institution, and the
institution knew or should have known occurred there.93 Each mem-
bership institution is responsible for the conduct of its intercollegiate
athletic program, which includes responsibility for the actions of all
members of the institution's staff, student-athletes, and other individ-
uals and groups representing the institution's athletics. 94 In other
words, the NCAA Bylaws require each institution to "exert proper
institutional control" over these parties.95 In addition, membership
89. "It is the responsibility of each member institution to establish and maintain an environ-
ment in which a student-athlete's activities are conducted as an integral part of the student-
athlete's educational experience." NCAA Bylaw Article 2.2.1 ("Overall Educational
Experience").
90. NCAA Bylaw Article 2.1.1 ("Responsibility for Control"). The institution's responsibility
for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program includes the "responsibility for the actions
of its staff members and for the actions of any other individual or organization engaged in activi-
ties promoting the athletics interests of the institution." NCAA Bylaw Article 2.1.2 ("Scope of
Responsibility").
91. NCAA Bylaw Article 2.8.1 ("Responsibility of Institution").
92. Id.
93. NCAA Bylaw Article 6.4.2 ("Representatives of Athletics Interests"). An institution's
"responsibility" for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program shall include responsibil-
ity for the acts of an independent agency, corporate entity (e.g., apparel or equipment manufac-
turer) or other organization when a member of the institution's executive or athletics
administration, or an athletics department staff member, has knowledge that such agency, corpo-
rate entity or other organization is promoting the institution's intercollegiate athletics program.
NCAA Bylaw Article 6.4.1 ("Independent Agencies or Organizations").
94. NCAA Bylaw Article 2.1 ("Responsibility for Control"). See also, NCAA Bylaw Article
2.1.1 ("Scope of Responsibility") (stating that the institution's responsibility for the conduct of
its intercollegiate athletics program includes responsibility for the actions of its staff members
and for the actions of any other individual or organization engaged in activities promoting the
athletics interests of the institution).
95. NCAA Bylaw Article 6.01.1 ("Institutional Control").
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institutions are also responsible for the actions of outside entities that
the institution knows or should know promotes or participates in the
institution's intercollegiate athletic program.96
If the NCAA determines an individual that represents the institu-
tion's athletic program has violated the NCAA Bylaws, the institution
can be found to have failed to "exert proper institutional control." 97
When the NCAA Committee on Infractions receives indication of a
possible violation of institutional control, the committee determines if
the institution violated its responsibilities by considering what activi-
ties the institution knew about and when it became aware of these
activities.98 When an institution's coach or staff member learns of a
possible violation, they must fulfill their obligation of institutional
control to avoid possible violation.99 To fulfill the obligation, the insti-
tution's representative must proceed in three stages. 00 First, they
must assess the credibility of the allegations, and if they think a viola-
tion may have occurred, they must turn the matter over to the institu-
tion's compliance department.o'0 Second, the institution's compliance
officers must conduct a similar assessment, and if they have reason to
believe a violation may have occurred, they must begin an investiga-
tion. 102 Finally, if the compliance officer's investigation reveals that a
rule infraction may have occurred, the institution must inform the
NCAA. 03 If the institution does not comply with these requirements,
the NCAA will find that the institution failed to "exert proper institu-
tional control."1 04
F. Discovery of NCAA Amateurism Violations
Although the NCAA has had problems with Amateurism for
years, 05 the NCAA was apprehensive to punish membership institu-
96. NCAA Bylaw Article 6.4 ("Responsibility of Actions from Outside Entities"). See
NCAA Bylaw Article 6.4.2 ("representatives of Athletics Interests") (discussing the criteria for
outside institutions that the member institution knew or should have known was acting as a
representative for that school).
97. See Josh Peter, USC's Price to Pay? YAH4OO! SPORTS (Sept. 14, 2006), http://rivals.yahoo.








104. See NCAA Bylaw Article 32.2 ("Preliminary review of Information").
105. For some time, sports agents and other third-parties have infiltrated the NCAA's enter-
prise, budding up with assistant coaches, and making a joke out of the NCAA's "amateurism"
regulations. See Stewart Mandel, With Harsh USC Penalties, NCAA Sends Warning to All Elite
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tions for their alleged violations evident by the lack of Amateurism
sanctions imposed. 106 However, in the last twenty years, the NCAA
has put its foot down against multiple institutions' football programs'
Article 12 violations. 0 7
1. Auburn University
In 1991, Erik Ramsey, a defensive back at Auburn University (Au-
burn), admitted to an Alabama newspaper that he had received im-
proper benefits, including financial benefits and payments for his
performance on the football field from an Auburn booster, and the
university's athletic director and head football coach, Pat Dye, while
competing for the university. 08 In a separate interview, Dye admitted
that he was aware Ramsey had received improper benefits while at
Auburn. 09 NCAA Bylaw Article 12.1.2.1.5 explicitly prohibits any
payment conditioned on the student-athlete's performance."i0
In 1993, after an extensive investigation, the NCAA released a re-
port that announced that Ramsey and Auburn violated NCAA Ama-
teurism regulations beginning in 1991.111 Because Dye was a
representative of Auburn athletics and admitted he was aware of
Ramsey's violations,1 12 the NCAA found that the university had failed
exert proper institutional control. 113 The NCAA also found Auburn
committed two other NCAA violations: unethical conduct"l 4 and er-
Programs, SI'ORTSH.LUSTARIEDI.CoM, June 10, 2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writ-
ers/stewart mandel/06/10/usc.penalties/index.html.
106. See id.
107. See infra notes 108-139 and accompanying text.
108. On September 27, 1991, Ramsey disclosed in "The Montgomery Advertiser" that he had
been taping conversations between him, Dye, and Auburn University boosters. On October 20,
1991 The Birmingham News printed excerpts from the tapes, which indicated that Ramsey had
solicited and received money from booster Bill (Corky) Frost. William Reed, The End May be
Nigh- After 10 Years, Auburn Coach Pat Dye Appears to be Losing his Grip on his Program as
Allegations of Payoffs-and Tiger Losses-Mount, SPORTSILLUSTrRATEiD.COM (Nov. 11, 1991),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1140239/2/index.htm.
109. See id.
110. Article 12.1.2.1.5 deems any payment "conditioned on the individual's or team's place
finish or performance or given on an incentive basis, or receipt of expenses in excess of the same
reasonable amount for permissible expenses given to all individuals or team members involved
in the competition" as a prohibited form of pay according to 12.1.2.1. If a student-athlete ac-
cepts a prohibited form of pay, the student-athlete is deemed ineligible for intercollegiate com-
petition. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.1.2 ("Amateur Status.").
111. See Reed, supra note 108.
112. See NCAA Bylaw Article 6.01.1 ("Institutional Control").
113. See NCAA Bylaw Article 6.01.1 ("Institutional Control").
114. Unethical conduct by a prospective or enrolled student-athlete or a current or former
institutional staff member includes:
(a) [r]efusal to furnish information relevant to an investigation of a possible violation
of an NCAA regulation when requested to do so by the NCAA or the individual's
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roneous certification of compliance with NCAA regulations. 15 Al-
though the school was heavily sanctioned in 1993 at the completion of
the investigation,116 Ramsey graduated from Auburn in 1992,"
before the NCAA investigation was complete."s The Kansas City
Chiefs selected Ramsey in the 1991 NFL draft." 9
2. University of Alabama
In 1995, at Auburn's rival institution, the University of Alabama
(Alabama), the NCAA completed an investigation of the acts com-
mitted by an Alabama cornerback, Antonia Langham.12 0 In its inves-
tigation, the NCAA determined that Langham signed with a sports
agent and applied for the NFL draft 21 in 1993, while he was compet-
institution; (b) [k]nowing involvement in arranging for fraudulent academic credit or
false transcripts for a prospective or an enrolled student-athlete; (c) [k]nowing involve-
ment in offering or providing a prospective or an enrolled student-athlete an improper
inducement or extra benefit or improper financial aid; (d) [k]nowingly furnishing the
NCAA or the individual's institution false or misleading information concerning the
individual's involvement in or knowledge of matters relevant to a possible violation of
an NCAA regulation; (e) [r]eceipt of benefits by an institutional staff member for facili-
tating or arranging a meeting between a student- athlete and an agent, financial advisor
or a representative of an agent or advisor; (f) [k]nowing involvement in providing a
banned substance or impermissible supplement to student-athletes, or knowingly pro-
viding medications to student-athletes contrary to medical licensure, commonly ac-
cepted standards of care in sports medicine practice, or state and federal law. This
provision shall not apply to banned substances for which the student-athlete has re-
ceived a medical exception per Bylaw 31.2.3.4; however, the substance must be pro-
vided in accordance with medical licensure, commonly accepted standards of care and
state or federal law; (g) [f]ailure to provide complete and accurate information to the
NCAA, the NCAA Eligibility Center or an institution's admissions office regarding an
individual's academic record (e.g., schools attended, completion of coursework, grades
and test scores).
NCAA Bylaw Article 10.1 ("Unethical Conduct").
115. See Potuto, supra note 35, at 290 n. 147.
116. See infra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
117. See Reed, supra note 108.
118. See Willian C. Rhoden, A Hard-to-Forget Voice From Auburn's Haunted Past, Niew
YORK TIMES (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/sports/ncaafootball/25rhoden.
html.
119. See Rick Telander, No Hero In Sight: What of An Ex-Auburn Football Player Who Chose
to Take the Money and Run His Tape Recorder?, SroiRTslLLUSTARTED.COM (Nov. 4, 1991),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 1140339/1/index.htm.
120. Maisel, supra note 17.
121. There are exceptions to the general NCAA rule, that an individual loses his or her ama-
teur status if, after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft. See
NCAA Bylaw Article 12 ("Amateurism"). In football, without affecting his amateur status, an
enrolled student-athlete (as opposed to a prospective student-athlete) may enter the NFL draft
one time during his collegiate career without jeopardizing eligibility in that sport, provided the
student-athlete is not drafted by any team in that league and the student-athlete declares his
intention to resume intercollegiate participation within 72-hours following the National Football
League draft declaration date. NCAA Bylaw Article 12.2.4.2.3 ("Exception-Football").
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ing as a student-athlete for Alabama. 122 The report announced that
after Langham signed with the agent and applied for the NFL draft,
he informed Alabama's head football coach, Gene Stallings, about the
draft but told Stallings no agent was involved.123 The NCAA decided
that Stallings was responsible to pursue the matter more diligently and
when he failed to do so, he violated his responsibility to exert proper
institutional control. 124 The NCAA determined that Langham lost his
amateur status starting at the time of the acts and became ineligible
for intercollegiate competition at that time.125 The NCAA also con-
cluded that Stalling's actions constituted "lack of institutional con-
trol." 2 6 The NCAA imposed sanctions with Alabama's football team
in 1995.127 However, Langham entered the NFL draft one year earlier
and was selected in the first round by the Cleveland Browns.128
3. University of Southern California
Most significantly, in June of 2010, the NCAA completed a four-
year investigation into the USC's athletic program.129 The NCAA's
report stated that, among other USC sports' violations, 30 USC's start-
ing running back from 2003 to 2005, Reggie Bush, accepted improper
benefits in violation of Article 12.131 The report determined that Bush
and his family had accepted more than $100,000132 from "marketing
agents" in the form of gifts, merchandise, trips, cash, an automobile,
housing, hotel lodging, and transportation starting in December 2004,
while Bush was competing as a student-athlete for USC.133 The
NCAA investigation determined that Bush lost his amateur status,
and, therefore, became ineligible for intercollegiate competition when
the improper benefits 3 4 began by at least December of 2004.135
122. Frank Litsky, FOOTBALL; Alabama Gets Probation and Other Penalties In Football,




125. See id.; Maisel, supra note 10.
126. See NCAA Bylaw Article 6.01.1 ("Institutional Control").
127. See infra notes 152-158 and accompanying text.
128. James Alder, 1994 NFL Draft Results, ABoUrr.com, page 1, http://football.about.com/od/
nfldrafthistory/a/1994draftresult.htm.
129. Greg Beacham, NCAA Drops the Hammer on USC Football, NBCSPORTS.CoM (June
10, 2010), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/37621070/ns/sports-college-football/.
130. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 1.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, YAHoo! SPoRTs (Sept. 15, 2006), http:/
/rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ys-bushprobe.
133. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 4-7.
134. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12.1.2 ("Amateur Status.").
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The NCAA also determined that USC violated the NCAA's Bylaws
because it failed to exert proper institutional control over Bush.136
The investigation found that one of USC's assistant football coaches,
Todd McNair, had been in contact with the sports agent and knew, or
should have known, that Bush and the agency partners were engaged
in violations that negatively affected Bush's Amateurism status.137
Furthermore, McNair provided false and misleading information to
the NCAA enforcement staff concerning his knowledge of agency
partner activity and signed a document certifying that he had no
knowledge of NCAA violations.138 In 2006, before the NCAA issued
any report regarding Bush's conduct at USC, Bush entered the NFL
and signed a six-year, twenty-six million contract with the New Orle-
ans Saints.139
G. Who is Sanctioned?
By the time the NCAA discovers an Amateurism violation, the
NCAA often possesses no ability to sanction the individual that vio-
lated the Bylaws because that individual is no longer a student-ath-
lete.140 Accordingly, the violations imposed on universities affect the
wrong parties.141 When wrong parties or innocent parties are affected
by the sanctions, the sanctions are inconsistent with the NCAA's pur-
pose of imposing regulations.142
1. Sanctions Imposed on Violating Institutions
a. Auburn University
As explained above, in 1993, the NCAA heavily sanctioned Au-
burn's football program for Ramsey and Dye's actions. 143 As a result
of Auburn's failure to exert proper institutional control, the NCAA
handed down some of its most severe sanctions to that point.144 The
sanctions included a two-year postseason bowl ban, a one-year televi-
135. NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 4.
136. NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 4, 18, 31, 36-38, 45-48.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id.
139. See Robinson, supra note 132.
140. See NCAA Bylaw Article 2.8.1 ("Responsibility of Institution"). For an interactive dia-
gram that exhibits the process of typical infractions, see National Collegiate Athletic Association
About the NCAA, http://webl.ncaa.org/web-video/newmedia/flashlNCAA%201nfractions.swf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
141. See infra notes from 142-217.
142. See NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of NCAA Enforcement Program").
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sion ban, and the loss of multiple football scholarships spread over a
four year period. 145 The sanctions began in 1993.146 The NCAA also
forced Dye out from all Auburn. 147 Meanwhile, Ramsey graduated
from Auburn in 1991148 and the Kansas City Chiefs drafted him in the
1991 NFL draft.149 Accordingly, by the time the NCAA sanctioned
Auburn, Ramsey was already finished with his collegiate football ca-
reer and was making an NFL salary.o50 Because the NCAA no longer
possessed authority over Ramsey,15 1 the NCAA never sanctioned
him; therefore, Ramsey never felt the consequences of his actions.152
b. University of Alabama
In 1995, following the NCAA's investigation into Langham's acts,
the NCAA imposed multiple sanctions on Alabama's football pro-
gram.15 3 The NCAA Committee on Infractions vacated "twenty-five
or so" of Alabama's football scholarships and put the university's ath-
letic program on a three-year probation.154 The NCAA also banned
the football team from all bowl games following its 1995 season and
forfeited the team's first eleven games from its 1993 season. 55 Al-
though Alabama appealed the sanctions to the Infractions Appeals
Committee,156 the NCAA only reduced the sanctions to seventeen va-
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. William C. Rhoden, Sports of The Times; For Ramsey, Home Is Where His Heart Is, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/20/sports/sports-of-the-times-for-ram-
sey-home-is-where-his-heart-is.html.
148. Ramsey walked across Auburn's graduation stage to receive his degree in 1992. Predict-
ably he was greeted with curses and boos from Auburn fans. In addition, it was rumored Ram-
sey wore a bulletproof vest on graduation day. Id. See Max C. Sconyers, Eric Ramsey Breaks His
Silence on Auburn Football Controversy, BLE iACHERREPORT.COM (Feb. 20, 2011), http://bleacher
report.com/articles/614915-auburn-on-probation-eric-ramsey-breaks-his-silence.
149. James Alder, 1991 NFL Draft Results, Auour.CoM, 4, available at http://football.about.
com/od/nfldrafthistorya/1991draftresult.htm.
150. See Thomas, supra note 143.
151. The NCAA Constitution governs student-athletes enrolled at a membership institution
and does not possess the power to govern individuals who are no longer collegiate student-
athletes. See NCAA Bylaw Article 2.8.1 ("Responsibility of Institution") ("Members of an in-
stitution's staff, student-athletes, and other individuals and groups representing the institution's
athletics interests shall comply with the applicable Association rules, and the member institution
shall be responsible for such compliance.").
152. See Thomas, supra note 143.
153. See Litsky, supra note 122.
154. Id.
155. See id. The games vacated were the games in which Langham was competing but was
receiving improper benefits and therefore ineligible for intercollegiate competition. See also
NCAA Bylaw Article 12.1.2 ("Amateur Status.").
156. Schools have the ability to appeal violations to the Infractions Appeals Committee. See
NCAA Bylaw Article 19.6.2 ("Appeal of Major Violations") ("A member shall have the right to
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cated scholarships and a two-year probation but upheld the bowl ban
and forfeited record. 57 Because Langham left Alabama in 1994 and
was drafted by the Cleveland Browns, 58 he did not endure the NCAA
sanctions.159
c. University of Southern California
In the 2010 case, the NCAA determined the university was a repeat
violator 60 since USC had also violated NCAA Bylaws in 2001.161 As a
result of its 2010 investigation, the NCAA issued multiple sanctions
on USC's football program, which included a two-year postseason
bowl ban from 2010-2012,162 a four-year probation,163 and a loss of
thirty football scholarships from 2011-2013.164 The NCAA also va-
cated the 2004-2005 USC football team's fourteen victories from De-
cember 2004 through the 2005 season, 65 including a Bowl
Championship Series (BCS) title game, and potentially a national
championship. 1 6 6 This sanction included a requirement that USC
reconfigure the head coach, Pete Carroll's, records to reflect the va-
cated results.167 In addition, all 2004-2005 USC football records had
to be reconfigured in all publications to reflect the forfeited record.168
This included USC's media and electronic guides, recruiting materials,
and archives.169 Similarly, the NCAA required USC to remove any
reference to the vacated results, including the bowl wins and champi-
onships from USC's stationary, banners and any other forums where
give written notice of appeal of the committee's findings of major violations, the penalty, or both
to the Infractions Appeals.").
157. Tide football program suffers decade of decline, USA ToDAY SPORT s, http://www.usa
today.com/sports/college/football/sec/2003-05-04-alabama-decade.htm (last updated May 20,
2005); see Litsky, supra note 122.
158. Alder, supra note 128.
159. See Litsky, supra note 122.
160. See NCAA Bylaw Article 19.5.2.3 ("Repeat Violators").
161. "This was the institution's sixth major infractions case. Most recently, the institution
appeared before the committee in June 2001 for a case involving the football and women's swim-
ming programs. Accordingly, USC is considered a 'repeat violator' under NCAA Bylaw
19.5.2.3." NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 3.
162. NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 57.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 57-63.
165. The NCAA determined that Bush had accepted improper benefits by December 2004.
At the time the first improper benefits were accepted, Bush compromised his amateur status,
and therefore, was ineligible for intercollegiate competition at that point. See id. at 57-58.
166. See BCS Likely to Force USC to Vacate 2004 Title, NBCSPORTS.COM (June 10, 2010),
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/37625939/ns/sports-collegejfootball.
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they appear.o7 0 Due to his involvement, McNair was banned from all
recruiting activities for a year.' 7
Bush conceded his Heisman Trophy 72 on September 10, 2010,
before the NCAA or the Heisman Foundation required him to do
so.'7 3 It was presumed that Bush would have been stripped of the
Trophy if he did not relinquish it first. 174 Aside from this, the NCAA
did not sanction Bush. 75 In fact in 2006, four years before the NCAA
handed down USC's sanctions, Bush signed a six-year contract with
the New Orleans Saints for a $26.3 million salary.176 Again, Bush, the
individual who caused the problems at a membership institution, no
longer attended the institution when the NCAA imposed its
sanctions.'77
III. WHO IS CALLED Our?
Although all above NCAA violations occurred while the student-
athletes were competing for a membership institution, none of the vio-
lating athletes were still at the institution to endure the NCAA sanc-
tions.178 In fact, by the time the sanctions were handed down to each
athlete's alma mater, a professional NFL team had already drafted all
three of the athletes.'7 9 Accordingly, the individuals most at fault in
the situation got off scot-free. 80 However, because the student-ath-
170. Id.
171. Ted Miller, Instant analysis: NCAA didn't buy USC's defense, PAC-10 BioG (June 10,
2010, 3:46 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/paclO. Although the NCAA did not require USC to fire
McNair, McNair's contract with USC expired on June 30, 2010 and USC did not renew it. See
Tim Miller, Report: McNair's USC Contract Not Renewed, PAc-10 BLOG (July 1, 2010, 2:38 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/pac10/post/_/id/10858/report-mcnairs-usc-contract-not-renewed.
172. Reggie Bush received the Heisman award on December 8, 2005 beating out University of
Texas player Vince Young and Bush's teammate at USC, quarterback Matt Leinart. Until that
point, Bush received the second most amount of first-place votes for Heisman Trophy winner,
second only to O.J. Simpson in 1968. Matt James, Another Trojan Wins Heisman, Cot-
LEGEFOOTBALLPoL.COM (Dec. 10, 2005), http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/2005_archive_
awards.html.
173. "In an unprecedented move, Reggie Bush relinquished his 2005 Heisman Trophy on
Tuesday, choosing to give back a singularly eminent award in American sport before most likely
being stripped of it." Bill Pennington, Reggie Bush, Ineligible for '05, Returns Heisman, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/sports/ncaafootball/15heisman.html.
Heisman voters stick by Cam Newton, ESPN.COM (Nov. 11, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/
news/story?id=5790626.
174. The Heisman ballot states: "The recipients must be in compliance with the Bylaws defin-
ing an NCAA student[-]athlete." Id.
175. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4.
176. See Robinson, supra note 132.
177. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 57-63.
178. See supra notes 148-177.
179. See Alder, supra note 158; Litsky, supra note 122; Robinson, supra note 132.
180. See Alder, supra note 158; Litsky, supra note 122; Robinson, supra note 132.
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letes involved in the violations did not endure the NCAA's sanctions,
individuals that were uninvolved in the violations are the individuals
who were actually affected by the sanctions. 81
Bush's example is the most illustrative. The result of USC's sanc-
tions? Although no other player on the 2004-2005 USC football team
was involved in the violation,18 2 the entire 2004-2005 USC football
team was forced to forfeit its season.'83 This includes the possibility of
striping eighty-five players'8 of a national championship and the hard
work, effort, and practice that came along with it.185 The NCAA also
erased Bush's former teammates' record from all USC archives, ban-
ners, guides, and many fans' minds.186 At a minimum, the former
players (the teammates who assisted Bush in receiving a National
Championship and a Heisman Trophy'87 ) were innocent parties pun-
ished by the NCAA's sanctions.188
The sanctions also imposed a significant blow to USC's athletic de-
partment and future USC football players. 8 9 The lost scholarships'90
and the bowl game ban' 91 will have an enormous impact on the uni-
versity's ability to recruit players,192 and accordingly, on the univer-
sity's athletic department.193 The limited scholarships prevent the
181. See infra notes 182-217 and accompanying text.
182. See id. at 1-67.
183. "Pursuant to NCAA Bylaws 19.5.2.2-(e)-(2) and 31.2.2.3-(b), the institution will vacate
all wins in which student-athlete 1 competed while ineligible, beginning in December 2004." Id.
at 57.
184. USC football team had 86 players on its 2004-2005 roster including Bush. See 2004 USC
Spring Football Numerical Roster, USCTROJANS.COM (March 9, 2004), http://www.usctrojans.
com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/usc-m-footbl-mtt-num.html.
185. "1 don't think any teammate of Bush wants to hear an apology. They lost more than
Bush for doing nothing at all. They did it the right way and earned every amount of success that
the 2005 team deserved. It's pretty sad that one player messes everything up for all of them."
Matt Petropulos, Reggie Bush Doesn't Deserve His Heisman, DAILY TITAN (Sept. 21, 2001),
http://www.dailytitan.com/2010/09/21/should-reggie-bush-be-stripped-of-his-heisman/.
186. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 58.
187. Bush commented on receiving the Heisman Trophy, "But I know that the Heisman is not
mine alone. Far from it. I know that my victory was made possible by the discipline and hard
work of my teammates, the steady guidance of my coaches." Id.
188. See id.
189. See Maisel, supra note 10.
190. NCAA imposed a limit of 15 football scholarships and 75 total grants in football for each
of the 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 academic years. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at
58.
191. "The institution's football team shall end its 2010 and 2011 seasons with the playing of its
last regularly scheduled, in-season contest and shall not be eligible to participate in any post-
season competition, including a bowl game, following the season." Id. at 57.
192. See Maisel, supra note 10.
193. Id.
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university from helping pay 30 student-athlete's tuition.' 9 4 Although
USC has been known as one of the best places in the country to play
college football, for many the school is extremely expensive to attend
without financial support from athletic scholarship money.195 USC's
inability to provide athletes scholarship money is an enormous deter-
rent from attending the university for prospective collegiate football
players because a student-athlete being recruited by USC could com-
mit to another football powerhouse, which would be able to pay for
some (or all) of his tuition.1 9 6 As a result, the ten football scholarships
taken from USC each year from 2011-2014 will have a significant im-
pact on USC's athletic department because the university will have a
difficult time recruiting the top high-school players in the nation.197
The two-year postseason bowl ban will also have a serious impact
on USC's athletic department.'19 A coach familiar with the situation
commented on the affect,' 9 9 "[t]he bowl ban will handicap USC's abil-
ity to bring in the top recruits .... [Y]ou can't get the top notch guys.
They won't listen to you .... When it [comes] down to it, they would
go somewhere they had a chance to play a big-time bowl game." 200
The top high-school players in the nation want to play collegiate foot-
ball for the university with the most "glamour." 201 When USC com-
petes for the best high-school players, the bowl ban will prevent the
university from recruiting these players because a university without
the capability of playing post season is not appealing, let alone
"glamorous." 202
Furthermore, the bowl ban will have a massive effect on the univer-
sity. 2 0 3 USC is known for its BCS bowl appearances 204 and were any
194. "A student-athlete may receive institutional financial aid based on athletic ability."
NCAA Bylaw Article 15.1 ("Maximum Limit on Financial AID-Individual").
195. USC's total tuition for an undergraduate student for the 2010-2011 school year was esti-
mated at about $57,000. 2010-2011 Estimate of Costs, UNIVERSIYOFourIITEN-
CAI.IFORNIA.COM, http://fbs.usc.edu/depts/sfs/page/4591/est-costs-2010-2011.
196. See NCAA Bylaw Article 15.1 ("Maximum Limit on Financial AID-Individual").
197. See Maisel, supra note 10.
198. See id.
199. Buddy Watt was a coach for Alabama's football team from 2003 to 2006, during a time
that the school was living out sanctions imposed by the NCAA in 2002 for a recruiting scandal
where boosters were accused of paying money for high school players. John Zenor, NCAA Rolls
Crimson Tide for Violations (Feb. 2, 2001), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
2002-02-01 -alabama-violations.htm.
200. See Maisel, supra note 10.
201. "They want to play big-time games and be on TV and reap all the benefits of all that
glamour." Id.
202. "You're going against Florida and LSU and Auburn. They could go to a bowl game and
you can't." Id.
203. See NCAA USC Report, supra note 4, at 57.
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of the 2011-2014 teams capable of making a bowl game, the sanctions
will cost the university millions.205 Bowl appearances are an enor-
mous source of revenue for any college athletic program,206 especially
one with a reputation for skill. Every BCS bowl game (Orange Bowl,
Sugar Bowl, Fiesta Bowl, Rose Bowl, and the National Champion-
ship) pays each participant school $18 million.207 Therefore, were any
of USC's 2011-2014 teams capable of making a bowl game, the sanc-
tions impose a financial penalty on the university.208
The sanctions also affect football players that compete for USC dur-
ing the years the sanctions are imposed.209 A former USC football
player, Ryan Kalil, from the 2003-2006 season commented on the
NCAA sanctions,
I think the most upsetting thing is, regardless of what is factual or
not, the kids who are there today are being punished.. . . There's a
team there that has nothing to do with it... But I think it's tough to
accept those facts, that these are the sanctions that [the NCAA] put
on them." 210
The best example of an innocent predecessor paying Bush's mis-
deeds is Matt Barkley, USC's starting quarterback from 2009 -2011
who committed to the university in 2008.211 Although Barkley had
offers to play at other universities, he committed to USC and started
his career there before the sanctions were imposed. 212 As a result of
the NCAA's ruling, Barkley will never have the hope of postseason
bowl play.2 1 3 "It does stink to possibly not play a bowl game, [b]ut at
204. Op-Ed., Money Over Morals, Ti, TIGER NEws (Oct. 1, 2001) available at http://www.the
tigernews.com/news.php?aid=6504&sid=2.
205. "[T]he NCAA sanctions could cost the USC athletic department millions of dollars in
revenue." Nakia Hogan, Reggie Bush Investigation Results in Major Sanctions for Southern Cal,
NolA.COM (June 11, 2010), http://www.nola.com/saints/index.ssf/2010/06/reggie-bush-investiga-
tion resu.htmi. See also, Zenor, supra note 199 (referencing Alabama's 2002 bowl ban: "[tlhe
sanctions could cost the university millions. Last year, Alabama received about $1.5 million
from its share of the Southeastern Conference's bowl proceeds and its take from the Indepen-
dence Bowl.").
206. Money Over Morals, supra note 204.
207. Id.
208. Hogan, supra note 205.
209. See Mandel, supra note 105.
210. Former Reggie Bush Teammate Ryan Kalil on USC Football Sanctions: 'Something's Not
Right Here,' USC BiLoG (June 28, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://articles.ocregister.com/2010-06-28/
sports/24553333_1_sanctions-usc-reggie-bush.
211. Arash Markazi, Top QB Matt Barkley has Pledged to USC a Year Early, SPORTSIlLUS-
TARTED.COM (Feb. 5, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/arash markazi/02/04/
barkley.usc.
212. See id.
213. "Matt Barkley, ... and the rest of the 2010 and '11 Trojans are the ones who will pay the
price for Bush's misdeeds." Mandel, supra note 105.
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the same time, I came here ... to win football games. If we play 13
instead of 14, then we're going to try to win all 13 of those games."214
Other USC players did not have such a positive response. 215 Sean-
trel Henderson, considered one of the top football prospects in the
nation in the class of 2010,216 verbally committed to USC in February
of 2010.217 Henderson, initially delayed signing with USC past na-
tional signing day as a result of concerns the program might face
NCAA sanctions.218 The sanctions, especially the inability to compete
in a postseason bowl game, were enough to convince Henderson to
back out of his obligation to USC.219 In July 2010, after the NCAA
sanctions were imposed, Henderson asked to be released from this
letter of intent with USC 220 and signed with the University of
Miami.221
In addition, two USC players also applied to transfer from USC
immediately after the sanctions were imposed.222 Defensive end,
Malik Jackson, announced following the sanctions that he would
transfer to University of Tennessee,223 and USC linebacker Jordan
Campbell, announced that he would transfer to the University of
Louisville. 224
The effects of the NCAA sanctions at USC were similar to those at
Alabama and Auburn.225 The results show that the individual who
214. Beacham, supra note 129.
215. See Joe Schad, USC Releasing Recruit Henderson, ESPN.CoM (July 6, 2010), http://sports.
espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5358730.
216. Gary Klein, USC football. Lane Kiffin Releases Seantrel Henderson From Letter of Intent,




218. Schad, supra note 215. "According to media reports, Kiffin misled [Henderson]. The
New York Times reported that Kiffin told Henderson and his family not to worry about poten-
tial NCAA sanctions." Pat Forde, USC's Punishment Sends Shock Waves, ESPN.Com (June 10,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde-pat&id=5273422.
219. Schad, supra note 215.
220. Id.
221. John Walters, Seantrel Henderson (and Dad) Will Get Their Kicks on the Other Coast,
FoornAiLiL FANIIOUSE (July 8, 2010), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/2010/07/08/seantrel-hen-
derson-and-dad-will-get-their-kicks-on-the-other-c/?synd=1.
222. Pedro Moura, Jackson Transferring to Tennessee, ESPN.CoM (July 6, 2010), http://sports.
espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5357110.
223. Id.
224. Pedro Moura, USC's Campbell Opts for Transfer, ESPN.Com (June 15, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5287292. Because of the NCAA's regulated
free-transfer policy for USC juniors and seniors following the sanctions, juniors and seniors on
USC football team were permitted to transfer schools without sitting out a season following the
transfer. See Moura, supra note 222.
225. See Litsky, supra note 122.
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received the improper benefits is not affected by the sanctions be-
cause he has escaped the university before the sanctions are handed
down.2 2 6 Accordingly, the parties that suffer the most are those that
were not involved in the violation. 227 The NCAA has admitted the
contradiction: "[un]fortunately, some sanctions, like the ban on post-
season competition , . . . also negatively impact innocent student-
athletes."228
A. Inconsistencies With the NCAA's Purpose
When wrong parties or innocent parties are affected by the sanc-
tions, the sanctions are inconsistent with the NCAA's purpose of im-
posing regulations.
The NCAA Bylaws provide:
It shall be the mission of the NCAA enforcement program to elimi-
nate violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties
should violations occur. The program is committed to fairness of
procedures and the timely and equitable resolution of infractions
cases. The achievement of these objectives is essential to the con-
duct of a viable and effective enforcement program. Further, an im-
portant consideration in imposing penalties is to provide fairness to
uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, administrators, competitors
and other institutions. 229
As seen above, when the NCAA does not impose sanctions on uni-
versities until after the violator has left collegiate athletics, innocent
parties are affected by the sanctions.230 When wrong or innocent par-
ties are the primary parties to pay the price for the violation, the sanc-
tions are inconsistent with the NCAA's purpose of imposing
regulations.231
226. The NCAA is "going after schools that have even the slightest problems with money-
related issues or issues with players that left years prior, such as Bush." Money Over Morals,
supra note 204.
227. "To punish future players based on their actions is unfair to the program and to the
players." Id.
228. National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Key
Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Rules Enforcement" hyperlink; then follow "Enforcement Pro-
cess") (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
229. NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of NCAA Enforcement Program"). See also,
National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Key Issues"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) ("The intent of the penalties is to ensure they are sufficient
enough to deter schools from breaking the rules again . . . . The NCAA enforcement process
seeks to ensure integrity and fair play among all member schools.").
230. See supra notes 177-215 and accompanying text.
231. See NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of NCAA Enforcement Program");
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1. Eliminate Violations
The NCAA's primary purpose for imposing regulations on a violat-
ing university is to deter future violations.232 A university that knew
about a student-athlete's involvement in an Amateurism violation
should be sanctioned. 233 However, football commentators and
coaches234 seem to believe that the responsibility of the university to
exert institutional control over high-profile athletes is unrealistic. 2 35 If
the people on the inside acknowledge the difficulty with the responsi-
bility imposed on universities, 236 the problem is not necessarily the
willingness of a university to break NCAA rules, but the near impossi-
232. See id.
233. It is the school's responsibility to ensure that student athletes are in compliance with the
NCAA rules and Bylaws. And where the school knew of the violations, it has a responsibility to
uncover it and try to prevent it. See NCAA Bylaw Article 2.1 "Responsibility for Control"); see
also Potuto, supra note 35.
234. See Mandel, supra note 105; Former Reggie Bush teammate Ryan Kalil on USC Football
Sanctions: 'Something's Not Right Here,' supra note 210.
235. A NCAA Committee chair was quoted on the situation saying:
[t]he real issue here is, if you have high-profile players, your enforcement staff has to
monitor those students at a higher level. It's [sic] extraordinarily important to recog-
nize that the [players] who are likely to be receiving these kinds of infractions with
people outside the institution are the same people who are likely to receive some sort
of financial reward down the road. High profile players mean high-profile
enforcement.
If you're a compliance officer at Florida, Texas or any other school teeming with
future first-round draft picks, [the NCAA's] ruling [against USC] should be sending
shivers down your spine. If you happen to be the next great quarterback or point guard
in the class of 2010 or 'll, be prepared to have your every hand-shake, conversation or
Facebook post with anyone outside of the school monitored. Not that that's remotely
plausible. [USC's School President Steven Sample responded to the sanctions:] "Moni-
toring and regulating human behavior is complex at best, and even more so in a far-
flung region like Los Angeles, home to a vast entertainment-sports enterprise."
Mandel, supra note 105. See also, Former Reggie Bush Teammate Ryan Kalil on USC Football
Sanctions: 'Something's Not Right Here,' supra note 210, stating:
The NCAA's argument is they (the university) should know what's going on with
their student athletes, in all aspects of their life. That's not realistic. You can't tell me
the NCAA really believes that the coaching staff, the front office, all the people in-
volved in the athletic department and compliance should know every aspect of a stu-
dent's life. I was extremely close to my offensive line coach, but if I called him today he
would not be able to tell you what kind of car I drove. As soon as practice is done and
we shower in the locker room, we're back out in the real world, and they have no say
about it. I always thought they did a great job of making sure we always knew what the
rules were. It's pretty simple. You don't have to have too many compliance meetings to
understand you cannot benefit in any way because of what you do. In my opinion,
there wasn't anything more the university could have done to know what was going on
in the student-athletes' lives outside of football.
236. "it is not inconceivable to believe USC did not know the extent of what was going on
between Bush and the agents. There is also no evidence that these problems were widespread
throughout the program." Money Over Morals, supra note 204.
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ble responsibility imposed on the universities. 237 Except for limited
situations, 2 3 8 sanctions will do little to deter universities from future
violations because the violations are usually unintentional. 2 3 9
The sanctions are inconsistent with the purpose of deterring future
violations by student-athletes. 240 If the sanctions were effective in this
regard, Bush would have witnessed the repercussions at Alabama and
Auburn, and would never have attempted a similar fleet. Instead,
Bush broke the Amateurism rules with "flying colors." 2 4 1 Presuma-
bly, Bush (and other high-profile student-athletes) know that agents
and teams want them, and they are also aware that by the time that
the hammer drops on their university, they will be safely situated with
an NFL team.2 4 2 This is not a deterrent. On the contrary, it seems
like an encouragement.
237. A source ridiculing the amateurism requirements contended:
Lack of institutional control, however, is a separate violation that arises out of af-
firmative institutional failure to take appropriate steps to assure rules compliant behav-
ior on the part of those for whom the institution is responsible. These run the gamut
from a president or chancellor to a booster unknown to an institution. Except in unu-
sual circumstances, there always is a lack of institutional control when violations are
committed by a high-level administrator with responsibility for a program and the au-
thority to administer it. There also is a lack of institutional control when a member
institution, through due diligence, should have known about the commission of viola-
tions regardless of who committed them.
Potuto, supra note 35, at 298.
238. In a situation where a coach is aware of the violation or assists in the violation, (for
example McNair at USC) the sanctions may have a deterrent effect if the NCAA imposes sanc-
tions directly on that coach. However, in McNair's situation, it was USC who imposed the most
severe penalty on McNair, discharging him from the university, not the NCAA. Therefore, the
deterrent effect for coaches, which stems from the NCAA's sanctions, is not substantial. SeeTed
Miller, Instant analysis: NCAA Didn't Buy USC's Defense, PAC-10 BiLoG (June 10, 2010, 3:46
PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/paclO; Tim Miller, Report: McNair's USC Contract Not Renewed,
PAC-10 BLOG (July 1, 2010, 2:38 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/pacl0/post/-lid/10858/report-
mcnairs-usc-contract-not-renewed.
239. Unintentional since the university usually believes it "[is] [going] to extraordinary lengths
in its monitoring efforts." Mandel, supra note 105.
240. See NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of NCAA Enforcement Program").
241. "[His] conduct while attending USC is nothing short of . . . cheating." Money Over
Morals, supra note 204.
242. "If history has taught us anything, it's that if people think they can get away with it with
little to no consequences to their actions, they're going to keep doing it." Eddie Garrison, Who's
To Blame, NCAA Athletes or Agents Who Try to Bribe Them?, (July 21, 2010), http://bleacher
report.com/articles/423052-whos-to-blame-ncaa-athletes-or-agents-who-try-to-bribe-them.
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2. Provide Fairness
The NCAA also announces a purpose of enforcing penalties is to
provide fairness in two ways.2 4 3 The first is to provide fairness to
uninvolved student-athletes, coaches, and schools.2 4 4 The second is to
provide compensation for any competitive advantage gained by the
infractions. 24 5 Neither is accomplished by the sanctions. 2 4 6
As described above, the goal of providing fairness to uninvolved
individuals is unaccomplished because uninvolved individuals bear the
burden of the sanctions. 2 4 7
"Does it make sense that USC is on four years of probation in the
future for something that happened half a decade ago under a coach
that is no longer there ... ? Obviously USC needed to be punished
. . . . But why penalize the future of teams no longer connected to
Bush . . . in any way? To punish future players based on their ac-
tions is unfair to the program and to the players." 248
It is clear that the sanctions not only avoid fairness to uninvolved
individuals, but also actually punish those individuals.2 4 9
Furthermore, the sanctions are inconsistent with the compensation
for competitive advantage purpose. In Amateurism violations, it is
unnecessary to compensate for any competitive advantage gained by
the infractions because a university does not gain a competitive ad-
vantage. Where a student-athlete loses his amateur status by ac-
cepting improper benefits in violation of the Article 12 Bylaws, 2 5 0 he
and his agent are the only parties benefitting from the actions. 251 Be-
cause the acceptance of these improper benefits usually comes in the
form of money, cars, trips, houses, the team does not gain a competi-
tive advantage from a team member violating the Amateurism By-
243. See National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org
(follow "About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How We Work" hyperlink; then follow
"Infractions" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
244. "An important consideration in imposing penalties is to provide fairness to uninvolved
student-athletes, coaches, administrators, competitors and other institutions." Id.
245. See id. See also National Collegiate Athletic Association Key Issues, http://www.ncaa.org
(follow "Key Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Rules and Enforcement" hyperlink; then follow
"Glossary of Terms" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) ("Major infractions usually provide an
extensive recruiting or competitive advantage.")
246. See infra notes 248-252 and accompanying text.
247. See NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of NCAA Enforcement Program").
248. Money Over Morals, supra note 204.
249. See supra notes 178-228 and accompanying text.
250. See NCAA Bylaw Article 12 ("Amateurism").
251. Id.
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law.2 5 2 Accordingly, the sanctions do nothing to promote fairness in
collegiate athletics.253
B. More Effective Sanctions Can Be Imposed to Support the
NCAA's Mission For Enforcement
The NCAA's decision to sanction USC's, Alabama's, and Auburn's
behavior was correct. However, the NCAA should consider other op-
tions in imposing the sanctions. On September 22, 2010, the NCAA
sanctioned two University of North Carolina (UNC) football players
for receiving improper benefits.254 The players, both of which were
returning seniors, were penalized with game suspensions and mone-
tary fines.2 5 5 UNC was not sanctioned.256 Although UNC contended
that the sanctions on the players were too severe, the sanctions are
fair because they were imposed directly on the individuals who vio-
lated the Bylaws. 257 As explained above, when the individual who vi-
olated the Bylaws is no longer at the institution, the NCAA should
apply sanctions that affect those who committed the violations and
not affect those who were not in violation. 258 In order to more suc-
cessfully implement sanctions that align with the NCAA's sanction
purposes, the NCAA should consider other sanction options. One op-
tion would be for the NCAA to enter into an agreement with the pro-
fessional sports leagues, specifically the NFL, which would require the
league to impose financial or professional penalties on incoming col-
legiate players that violated the NCAA Amateurism Bylaws while
competing in college.259 Here, the NCAA would come to an agree-
ment with the NFL. Upon the completion of an NCAA investigation,
if the NCAA deems that the player entering the NFL violated the
NCAA Amateurism Bylaws in college, the NCAA and NFL would
impose a penalty on the player for his detrimental conduct. 260 The
252. See Potuto, supra note 35, at 300.
253. See id.
254. Marvin Austin suspended indefinitely, ESPN.com CoLLEGEir FOOTHALL BiLOG (Sept. 2,




258. See supra notes 243-253 and accompanying text.
259. When the University of Alabama head football coach Nick Saban organized a conference
call, which gathered NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, representatives from the NCAA, the
NFL Players Association to discuss ways to solve the problem of amateurism one suggestion was
to impose a penalty on incoming college players that have violated the NCAA amateurism rules.
Chase Goodbread, Meyer, Other Coaches Discuss Agents with NFL, GAINESVii.L.COM (Aug.
13, 2010), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100812/articles/100819806.
260. "Maybe [the] consequences ought to carry over into their NFL career. Is it not conduct-
detrimental if a player does the wrong thing in college and gets suspended for his senior season,
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NCAA could choose to have the NFL impose the post-NCAA penal-
ties in the form of financial penalties, suspensions during the athlete's
rookie season, or a penalty imposed on the athlete's draft ability. Any
of these options would more effectively work with the NCAA's pur-
pose for imposing sanctions. These sanctions would more effectively
work with the NCAA's purpose for imposing sanctionS261 because a
consequence imposed on the athlete in the NFL regarding his eligibil-
ity or financial capabilities would definitely cause a college athlete to
think twice about violating Amateurism Bylaws. 262 The post-season
sanction would provide fairness to uninvolved individuals because it
would allow the NCAA to sanction the violating individuals and not
sanction the athletes that attend the school after the violation
occurred.
Another possible alternative solution would be for the NCAA to
create a preliminary violation consequence. When the NCAA learns
of a potential Amateurism violation, it would do a preliminary investi-
gation that would last around a week. After this investigation, the
athlete accused of the actions would be placed on a temporary proba-
tion if the preliminary investigation uncovered evidence that met a
certain burden 263 of proof that he committed an Amateurism viola-
tion. For example if a preponderance of evidence indicated that an
Amateurism violation occurred, the student-athlete would be placed
on temporary probation. While the athlete is on temporary probation,
the NCAA would then go through a normal investigation to deter-
mine whether or not the athlete violated the Bylaws. If the NCAA
determined that a violation did occur, the student-athlete would then
be sanctioned immediately, if the NCAA determined that a violation
did not occur, the student-athlete would be allowed back on the field.
IV. IMPACT
The NCAA's current ineffective approach must be changed if the
reputation of college athletics is to be saved. Some recommend elimi-
nating the Amateurism violations all together, 264 while others argue
just so he can play in the NFL? It hurts the NFL, it hurts college, it hurts the player, it hurts
everybody, so why shouldn't he get suspended for conduct detrimental?" Id.
261. See supra notes 232-242 and accompanying text.
262. See Garrison, supra note 242.
263. Because the violation is a civil matter (as opposed to criminal), the burden should be
placed in accordance with civil law; accordingly, the initial investigation would require a prepon-
derance of evidence to signal that an Amateurism violation occurred.
264. See Patrick Hruby, Fix for NCAA violations: Legalize 'em! ESPN.com (July 26, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.comlespn/commentary/news/story?page=hruby/100726 (arguing that the
NCAA should eliminate the amateurism violations all together).
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that there must be more control over the student-athletes while they
are competing at the collegiate level.2 6 5 Regardless, the way the
NCAA deals with this ongoing problem will determine if America's
national pastime can be cleaned up to preserve its reputation. The
increase in Amateurism violations has caused fans to be cynical about
the NCAA's control over athletic programs. If the NCAA changes its
enforcement method, the decrease in the violations will reassure fans
of their control.
It is easy to see why individuals violate the sanctions. In a highly
competitive field, agents and athletes weigh the risks and benefits of
committing an Amateurism violation and realize that the benefits of
the actions enormously outweigh the few repercussions. 266 An agent
giving a high-profile athlete a couple hundred thousand dollars while
he is in college is enough to convince the athlete to sign a two million
dollar contract with that agent two years later. And although a stu-
dent-athlete cannot see the benefits of avoiding a violation while in
school, curbing this problem is important for the game. College ath-
letics are amateur sports,267 and in order to keep collegiate sports am-
ateur, the NCAA must protect against situations where athletes
accept money or other benefits.
College athletes "in every major collegiate sport who are profes-
sional prospects [will continue] to retain a representative experienced
and knowledgeable in their particular sport to assist them in obtaining
maximum draft status, and rightfully so."268 The NCCA's decision to
change its current approach will have an enormous effect on an
agent's actions and a student-athlete's actions. If the NCAA created
an alliance with professional sports leagues that allowed the NCAA to
sanction athletes playing in the professional sports league, there
would be a decrease in the number of violations. Furthermore, this
change would protect collegiate athletics as amateur sports.
265. National Collegiate Athletic Association About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow
"Resources" hyperlink; then follow "Latest News" hyperlink; then follow "Interview with
NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities" hyperlink) (last visited Jan.
18, 2011).
266. See supra notes 232-242 and accompanying text.
267. Amateur is defined as "[a] person who engages in an art, science, study, or athletic activ-
ity as a pastime rather than as a profession." National Collegiate Athletic Association About
the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "About the NCAA" hyperlink; then follow "How we
work" hyperlink; then follow "Rules and Committees" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
268. Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA'S Regulations Related to the Use ofAgents in the Sport of
Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, Timn ECONOM-
ICS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS, 224 (2005).
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Seeing the immense interest and attention in the topic during the
2010-2011 football season269 indicates sport's fans fascination and in-
terest in the problem. It is clear that if the NCAA intends to curb the
violations, its approach to imposing violations must change. How the
NCAA deals with Bylaw violations in the future will determine how
successfully the Amateurism problem will be stopped.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 12 of the NCAA Bylaws sets forth a requirement that all
collegiate athletes competing for an NCAA institute maintain their
eligibility to compete by requiring the athletes to retain their amateur
status.270 In order to maintain this status, the student-athlete must
follow the eligibility requirements laid out in the Article 12 Bylaws,
which prohibit the student-athlete from accepting goods, money, or
other items for their performance or from any sports agent.271 Sepa-
rate Bylaws govern the sanctions available to the NCAA when an
Amateurism violation has occurred. The NCAA proclaims that the
purpose for the enforcement program is to eliminate violations of the
NCAA rules, impose appropriate penalties should violations occur,
while considering the fairness to uninvolved student-athletes, coaches,
administrators, competitors, and other institutions. 272 However, the
NCAA has struggled to keep the Amateurism penalties in line with
these purposes.273 Accordingly, the NCAA must work quickly to de-
termine an alternative solution to the Amateurism problem otherwise
the number of violations will continue to rise and collegiate football
will continue to be plagued with the problem.
Mary Elizabeth Kane*
269. See e.g., Lynn Zinser, N.C.A.A. Says Tressel Hid Violations, New YORK TIMEs (Apr.25,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/sports/ncaafootball/26tressel.html?ref=sports; Brett
McMurphy, Ex-Players Tell of Receiving Illicit Payments at Auburn and Elsewhere, NIw YORK
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2011); Joe Schad, Sources: Newtons Talked of Pay Plan, ESPN.com (Nov. 11,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5786315.
270. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
272. NCAA Bylaw Article 19.01.1 ("Mission of the NCAA Enforcement Program").
273. See supra notes 229-253 and accompanying text.
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